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Psychotic phenomena manifest in healthy and clinical 
 populations as complex patterns of aberrant  perceptions 
(hallucinations) and tenacious, irrational beliefs ( delusions). 
According to predictive processing accounts, hallucinations 
and delusions arise from atypicalities in the integration 
of prior knowledge with incoming  sensory information. 
However, the computational details of these  atypicalities 
and their specific  phenomenological  manifestations are 
not well characterized. We tested the hypothesis that 
 hallucination-proneness arises from increased reliance on 
overly general application of prior knowledge in perceptual 
inference, generating percepts that readily capture the gist 
of the environment but  inaccurately render its details. We 
separately probed the use of prior knowledge to perceive 
the gist vs the details of  ambiguous images in a healthy 
population with varying degrees of hallucination- and delu-
sion-proneness. We found that the use of prior  knowledge 
varied with psychotic phenomena and their composition in 
terms of aberrant percepts vs aberrant beliefs. Consistent 
with previous findings,  hallucination-proneness conferred 
an advantage using prior knowledge to perceive image gist 
but, contrary to predictions, did not confer  disadvantage 
perceiving image details. Predominant hallucination-
proneness actually conferred advantages perceiving both 
image gist and details, consistent with reliance on highly 
detailed perceptual knowledge. Delusion-proneness, 
and especially predominance of  delusion-proneness over 
 hallucination-proneness, conferred disadvantage perceiving 
image details but not image gist, though evidence of specific 
impairment of detail perception was preliminary. We suggest 
this is consistent with reliance on abstract, belief-like 
knowledge. We posit that phenomenological variability in 
psychotic experiences may be driven by variability in the 
type of knowledge observers rely upon to resolve percep-
tual ambiguity.




Hallucinations and delusions can be modeled within a 
predictive processing framework, in which perceptions 
and beliefs represent the brain’s best inference about the 
causes of its sensory inputs.1–3 This framework posits that 
sensation is inherently ambiguous; the brain must com-
pare sensory measurements to predictions, akin to “per-
ceptual hypotheses,”4,5 drawn from preexisting knowledge 
and infer the most likely cause of those sensations. The 
relative influences of sensory evidence and prior knowl-
edge in this integration are determined by their reliabili-
ties6: when sensory information is unreliable, predictions 
should be weighted more strongly, and vice versa. The 
reliabilities of sensory information and prior knowledge 
also shape learning. Disagreement between predictions 
and sensory inputs generates “prediction errors” that 
could reflect meaningful changes in environmental states 
necessitating new learning, ie, changing one’s predictions 
by updating internal models.7,8 Importantly, however, 
learning should be scaled to the reliability of informa-
tion sources, with large changes in internal models taking 
place only when prediction errors are reliable.9–11
Psychotic experiences like hallucinations and delu-
sions may arise when reliability weighting of informa-
tion sources goes awry, causing perceptions and beliefs 
to diverge from objective reality.12–14 Within this frame-
work, hallucinations can be modeled as false inferences, 
caused by overweighting the reliability of predictions.15–18 
Delusions may be considered internal models that mis-











could arise through inappropriate learning from unrelia-
ble prediction errors.19
Such models of psychotic phenomena in patients and 
psychosis-prone people have been tested by manipulat-
ing both prior knowledge and sensory input.20–22 In a 
previous study, in which we kept sensory input constant 
while manipulating prior knowledge, individuals at high 
risk of clinical psychosis showed a shift toward greater 
influence of prior knowledge.21 This shift was measured 
as an advantage in discriminating ambiguous images that 
contained an embedded figure, the perception of which 
was facilitated by experimentally provided prior knowl-
edge.21 The advantage was also present in healthy individ-
uals scoring highly on scales of aberrant perceptions and 
aberrant beliefs, though more associated with the former 
than the latter.
While this specificity is in line with previous sug-
gestions that hallucinations are a consequence of an 
increased influence of prior knowledge on perception,15–18 
it provides no further detail about the underlying com-
putational mechanisms. In the current study, we tested 
the hypothesis that this shift could be explained by more 
flexible fitting of predictions to sensory data, such that 
percepts are generated based on a weaker match between 
predictions and sensory inputs (figure 1a). This process 
could maintain stable percepts when sensory evidence 
is unreliable but might come with the cost of tolerating 
greater mismatch between predictions and inputs, pre-
disposing to false/inaccurate percepts. In extremis, we 
consider this a model of hallucinations and aberrant 
perceptions: a marked dissociation of percepts (and their 
implications) from sensory evidence.
Methods
Manipulating Prior Knowledge in Perception
We investigated the influence of prior knowledge on 
 perception of figures (humans/animals) embedded in 
“two-tone” images, generated by binarizing  natural 
images around luminance thresholds (figure  1b). 
 Two-tone images were near-impossible to  disambiguate 
in isolation. However, observers could readily generate 
rich percepts of embedded figures after gaining prior 
knowledge of image content, provided by viewing the 
natural image from which a two-tone was generated 
(the “template” image, figure 2c). For stimuli details, see 
online supplementary material.
Task Design
The task had 2 conditions. The “Global” condition 
(figure  1c) probed the generation of percepts regard-
less of their accuracy and required knowledge of global 
image gist. The “Local” condition (figure 1d) probed the 
Fig. 1. (a) Theoretical function determining probability of generating percepts based on sensory evidence explained by predictions 
(perceptual hypotheses). At (i), no predictions explain enough evidence in a two-tone to generate a percept. At (iii), templates are 
recognized using existing prior knowledge. At (ii), prior knowledge increases probability of generating percepts.23 Generating a percept 
when less evidence is explained (leftward-shifted function), which we hypothesized occurs in early psychosis and psychosis-proneness, 
might readily generate percepts that sometimes misrepresent the environment, giving rise to anomalous inferences. (b) An example of a 
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generation of percepts with accurate local details. On each 
trial, observers discriminated whether a small dot on a 
two-tone was on or off any embedded figures. For each 
two-tone and each condition, paired possible dot locations 
were manually chosen, one on-figure and one off-figure.
Global condition locations were equidistant from the 
image center, far from figure edges and, ideally, separated 
by patches demarcating figure edges. On-figure/off-figure 
discriminations should thus be possible even from inac-
curate percepts.
Local condition locations were equidistant from a 
figure contour that was present in the template (identified 
using an edge detection algorithm) but invisible in the 
corresponding two-tone. Dot locations were very close 
on either side of this contour, so on-figure/off-figure dis-
criminations required percepts with accurate fine details.
Observers made the same discriminations before and 
after gaining prior knowledge from templates on “tem-
plate trials” (“Pre-Template” and “Post-Template,” 
respectively, figure 2a). The same images were used in the 
Global and Local conditions; furthermore, conditions 
were interleaved and counterbalanced for within-sequence 
order effects. Identical Pre-Template and Post-Template 
trials allowed us to isolate the effects of prior knowledge 
on perception by examining within-subject change in 
performance after seeing the template image (figure 2b). 
For full details of task design, see online supplementary 
material.
We predicted that psychosis-prone observers would 
generate percepts readily but inaccurately, manifesting as 
advantage in the Global condition and disadvantage in 
the Local condition.
Observers
Forty observers who self-reported no current or past 
mental illness were recruited via university and depart-
mental e-mail lists at the University of Cambridge. 
The study was approved by the Cambridge Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee (Reference PRE.2013.31). 
We measured 2 dimensions of psychosis-proneness with 
self-report questionnaires. Delusion-proneness was meas-
ured with the Peters Delusions Inventory (Brief) (PDI).24 
Hallucination-proneness was measured with the Cardiff  
Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS).25 The total score 
(sum of subscales) for each instrument was used.
Outcome Measures
Objective ability to perform on-figure/off-figure dis-
criminations in each condition was calculated using 
Fig. 2. (a) Observers discriminated whether a dot was on/off  a figure embedded in two-tone images in “two-tone trials.” Observers 
gained prior knowledge about two-tones from natural images in “template trials.” (b) Trials were grouped into two-tone and template 
blocks. Two-tone blocks contained 24 trials with 6 two-tones, each presented 4 times (all combinations of dot on/off, Global/Local 
condition). Per two-tone block, observers had viewed templates for 3 images (Post-Template) but not the others (Pre-Template). 
Pre-template and Post-Template two-tones were interleaved. Template blocks contained presented 3 templates, corresponding to Pre-
Template two-tones from the preceding block. There were 30 two-tone/template images and 10 of each block. (c) An example of a 











discriminability index (d′), derived from signal detec-
tion theory (see online supplementary material for 
detail). Critically, changes in d′ could arise from a 
greater ability to use prior knowledge to extract infor-
mation from two-tones or from more strategic behav-
iors like waiting longer to collect information before 
responding, which might not be related to the use of 
prior knowledge. We distinguished these possibilities 
using the drift-diffusion model (DDM), a widely used 
computational model of  perceptual decision-making.
Briefly, the DDM treats two-alternative deci-
sion-making as the noisy accumulation of  evidence 
toward 2 decision boundaries over time. The rate of 
evidence accumulation, parameterized as “drift rate” 
(v), indicates the efficiency of  information extraction. 
Increasing drift rate improves accuracy while speed-
ing decision-making. The information needed to make 
decisions is indicated by the distance between decision 
boundaries, parameterized as “decision threshold” 
(a). Increasing decision threshold improves accuracy 
while slowing decision-making. We predicted psycho-
sis-proneness would be associated with more efficient 
prior knowledge-dependent information extraction 
from two-tone images, reflected in drift rate, but not 
with differences in decision threshold. A  hierarchical 
Bayesian DDM was fit to reaction time data using the 
“HDDM” package26 (see online supplementary mate-
rial for details).
Statistical Analyses
We investigated effects of conditions and template expo-
sure on d′, drift rate, and decision threshold using 2 × 
2 factorial ANOVAs with factors “Template-Exposure” 
(Pre-Template/Post-Template) and “Condition” (Global/
Local). Follow-up comparisons were performed with 
paired Welch’s t tests with the Holm correction for con-
trol of family-wise error.
Associations with hallucination-proneness and delu-
sion-proneness were investigated using linear regres-
sions predicting the change in d′ (Δd′), drift rate (Δv), 
and decision threshold (Δa) caused by gaining prior 
knowledge through template exposure. Planned uni-
variate analyses were conducted, testing the predicted 
Global-advantage and Local-disadvantage associated 
with absolute levels of  psychosis-proneness. Planned 
multiple regression analyses were conducted to test 
whether the effect was more specifically associated 
with anomalous perceptions vs anomalous beliefs, 
predicted on the basis of  previous results21 (see online 
supplementary material for details).
We report uncorrected P values and investigate the 
robustness of results using Benjamini-Hochberg step-up 
correction for 5% false discovery rate over all 36 compari-
sons with CAPS/PDI.
Results
Two observers were excluded from the analysis: one saw 
the stimuli in a previous study; another misunderstood 
the instructions.
The CAPS and PDI showed positive skew that was 
corrected to normality by square-root transformation. 
Hallucination-proneness and delusion-proneness corre-
lated (Pearson r = .67, t(36) = 5.42, P < .001).
Perceptual Performance
Prior knowledge facilitated perception of figures embed-
ded in two-tone images (figure 3a; Template-Exposure main 
effect: F(1, 40.66) = 138.64, P < .001), shown in both the Global 
(t(37) = 6.43, PHolm < .001, D = 2.11) and Local (t(37) = 8.44, 
 PHolm < .001, D = 2.77) conditions. The Global condition 
was easier (Condition main effect: F(1, 35.31) = 120.39, P < .001), 
with higher d′ Pre-Template (t(37) = 6.43, PHolm < .001, D = 
2.11) and Post-Template (t(37) = 15.68, PHolm < .001, D = 5.16), 
which is consistent with the Global condition requiring only 
coarse percepts and the Local condition requiring detailed 
percepts. The magnitude of improvement with template ex-
posure was greater in the Global than the Local condition 
(Template-Exposure * Condition interaction: F(1, 8.18) = 27.89, 
P < .001), confirmed by follow-up comparison (t(37) = 8.66, 
PHolm < .001, D = 2.85). We interpreted these expected find-
ings as evidence that the task conditions were working as 
intended.
Prior Knowledge Facilitated Perceptual Discrimination 
by Improving Evidence Extraction
Prior knowledge increased the efficiency of information 
extraction, supported by higher drift rate (Template-
Exposure main effect: F(1, 148) = 430.5, P < .001), evident 
in Global (t(37) = 19.30, PHolm < .001, D = 6.35) and Local 
(t(37) = 20.98, PHolm < .001, D = 6.90) conditions (figure 3a).
Information was extracted more efficiently about 
image gist than about precise details, indicated by 
higher Global than Local drift rate (Condition main 
effect: F(1, 148) = 477.0, P < .001), evident in both Pre-
Template (t(37) = 11.64, PHolm < .001, D = 3.83) and 
Post-Template (t(37) = 18.29, PHolm < .001, D = 6.02). 
Prior knowledge improved information extraction 
about gist more than about precise details (Template-
Exposure * Condition interaction: F(1, 148) = 104.8, 
P < .001, follow-up: t(37) = 14.11, PHolm < .001, D = 4.63) 
(figure 3a).
Prior knowledge caused observers to make decisions 
based on less evidence, indicated by lower decision thresh-
old (Template-Exposure main effect: F(1, 148)  =  22.490, 
P < .001), evident in both Global (t(37)  =  5.124, 
PHolm < .001, D  =  1.68) and Local (t(37)  =  7.85, 
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Prior knowledge was therefore only likely to improve 
on-figure/off-figure discriminations by increasing effi-
ciency of information extraction, rather than observ-
ers waiting to accumulate more evidence. Accordingly, 
Δd′ and Δv correlated in the Global (r =  .85, t = 9.56, 
P < .001) and Local (r = .76, t(36) = 57.04, P < 0.001) con-
ditions. There was no association between Δd′ and Δa.
Effects of Hallucination-Proneness and Delusion-
Proneness on Perceptual Performance
Univariate Analyses. Consistent with our previous 
work, hallucination-proneness (CAPS) predicted advan-
tage using prior experience to perceive the gist of figures 
in two-tones, indicated by association between halluci-
nation-proneness and Global Δd′ (figure  4a, t  =  2.382, 
P = .023, D = 0.79, requiv = .37). This was not reflected in Δv 
(figure 4b). Contrary to predictions, hallucination-prone-
ness was not associated with disadvantage discriminating 
specific contours, showing no relationship with Δd′ or Δv 
in the Local condition (figures 4a and 4b).
There was a trend toward the hallucination-proneness 
advantage being specific to gist perception, indicated 
in difference in Δv across Global and Local conditions 
(t = 1.853, P = .072, D = 0.62, requiv = .3). This effect was 
not apparent in Δd′. Together, these results suggested 
that hallucination-prone healthy observers’ enhanced 
ability to readily generate template-derived percepts of 
two-tone images (as evidenced by their advantage in the 
Global condition) did not come at the cost of an inability 
to perceive specific details.
We found evidence for the predicted psychosis-asso-
ciated disadvantage in perceiving image details associ-
ated only with delusion-proneness, which, in the Local 
condition, predicted smaller Δv (figure  4d, t  =  −2.278, 
P  =  .029, D  =  0.76, requiv  =  −.35) and trend-predicted 
smaller Δd′ (figure 4c, t = −1.83, P =  .076, D = −0.61, 
requiv  =  −.29). Higher delusion-proneness also predicted 
larger differences in discrimination of image gist and 
Fig. 3. (a) Mean (SE) discriminability (d′), drift rate (v), and decision threshold (a) across task conditions. Template prior knowledge 
allowed participants to extract evidence faster (higher drift rate, v) and make perceptual decisions based on less evidence (lower decision 
threshold, a), with an overall improvement in discrimination (higher d′). (b) Δd′ and Δv correlated in both conditions, supporting that 











details, indicated by difference in Δd′ across conditions 
(t  =  2.32, P  =  .026, requiv  =  .36, D  =  0.77). Delusion-
proneness showed no relationship with Global condition 
Δd′ or Δv (figures 4c and 4d).
Multiple Regression Analyses. We observed striking and 
opposing effects of the composition of psychotic phe-
nomena in terms of delusion-proneness and hallucina-
tion-proneness on perceptual inference.
Observers who were more hallucination-prone than delu-
sion-prone readily generated percepts of figures embedded 
in two-tone images with a high degree of accurate image 
detail. Predominant hallucination-proneness (CAPS, con-
trolling for PDI) conferred moderate advantage using prior 
knowledge to perceive image gist, shown by greater Δd′ in 
the Global condition (figure 4e, t = 2.17, P = .037, D = 0.72), 
though not reflected in Δv (figure 4f). Importantly, predom-
inant hallucination-proneness conferred large advantage 
using prior knowledge to perceive image details, shown by 
greater Δd′ and Δv in the Local condition (Δd′: figure 4e, 
t = 4.23, P < .001, D = 1.41; Δv: figure 4f, t = 2.43, P = .02, 
D = 0.81), suggesting generation of detailed percepts that 
were highly faithful to the template information. This advan-
tage was not specific to one condition, with no difference in 
Δd′ or Δv across Global and Local conditions.
In contrast, we found preliminary evidence that 
observers who were more strongly delusion-prone than 
hallucination-prone could discriminate a figure’s general 
location but poorly discriminated precise figure contours. 
Predominant delusion-proneness (PDI, controlling for 
CAPS) predicted neither advantage nor disadvantage 
perceiving gist, with no association with Global condi-
tion Δd′ or Δv (figures 4g and 4h). However, predomi-
nant delusion-proneness predicted large disadvantage 
in the Local condition (Δd′: figure 4g, t = −4.48, P < 
.001, D = −1.51; Δv: figure 4h, t = −3.43, P = .002, D = 
−1.14). There was a trend toward specific Local condition 
impairment in Δd′ across the conditions (t = 1.72, P = 
0.093, D = 0.57), though not evident in Δv, suggestive of 
condition specificity.
Importantly, there were no associations between 
change in Δa with template exposure and either halluci-
nation-proneness or delusion-proneness in univariate or 
multiple regressions, supporting our prediction that psy-
chosis-proneness would affect perceptual discrimination 
by modifying ability to use prior knowledge to extract in-
formation from two-tone images.
Multiple Testing and Post Hoc Tests. The multi-
ple regression associations were the most robust; Δd′ 
Fig. 4. Univariate regressions showed hallucination-proneness (CAPS) was associated with greater improvement in discriminability (Δd′) 
with template exposure (a) but this was not reflected in change in drift rate (Δv) (b). Delusion-proneness trend-predicted lower Δd′ (c) 
and predicted lower Δv in the Local condition (d). Multiple regressions showed a different pattern of results. Predominant hallucination-
proneness predicted greater Δd′ in the Global condition (e) but also greater Δd′ and Δv in the Local condition (e and h). In contrast, 
predominant delusion-proneness predicted lower Δd′ and Δv in the Local condition (g and h). R-values are equivalent correlations. 
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advantage associated with predominance of hallucina-
tion-proneness and disadvantage in Δd′ and Δv associ-
ated with predominance of delusion-proneness remained 
significant when corrected for 5% false discovery rate. 
Our other results did not survive this correction and 
should thus be considered preliminary.
Given that we only found trend-level evidence of con-
dition-specific effects associated with predominance of 
anomalous beliefs, we include post hoc analyses in the 
online supplementary material showing consistent results 
with conditions collapsed.
Discussion
We tested the hypothesis that psychosis-proneness in a 
nonclinical sample would entail a computational shift in 
perceptual inference toward generating percepts based on 
poorer fit between sensory inputs and predictions derived 
from prior knowledge. Psychosis-proneness should thus 
predict better extraction of coarse perceptual gist in situ-
ations that heavily rely on predictions, but an impairment 
in extracting fine perceptual details. Though partly borne 
out, our results demand a more complex explanation. 
First, in keeping with our prediction and with previous 
results,21 hallucination-proneness was associated with a 
greater ability to use prior knowledge to discriminate fig-
ures embedded in ambiguous images, consistent with the 
idea that anomalous perceptions arise from a changed 
integration of sensory evidence with top-down predic-
tions.13,17,27 However, hallucination-proneness did not pre-
dict inaccurate perception of image details. Indeed, when 
we considered within-individual balance between halluci-
nation- and delusion-proneness, we found that higher lev-
els of aberrant perception in the context of lower levels of 
aberrant beliefs were associated with better perception of 
both image gist and fine details. Critically, diffusion-drift 
modeling showed that this improvement was not due to 
changes in decision threshold, indicating strategic differ-
ences, but was driven by more efficient visual extraction 
of evidence. This suggests that hallucinations arise from 
over-reliance on top-down predictions. Contrary to ex-
pectations, prior knowledge supported visual extraction 
of highly detailed perceptual information in hallucina-
tion-prone observers with lower anomalous beliefs.
Conversely, delusion-prone observers, and particularly 
those with higher aberrant beliefs but lower aberrant 
perceptions, were relatively disadvantaged using prior 
knowledge to discriminate embedded figures. There was 
preliminary evidence that this was specific to discriminat-
ing those figures’ precise details vs their general locations. 
This disadvantage was driven by less efficient evidence 
extraction, rather than changing decision thresholds., 
Neither absolute delusion-proneness or delusion-prone-
ness relative to hallucination-proneness impaired delu-
sion-prone observers in using prior knowledge to visually 
extract information pertaining to the images’ broad 
meanings.
These findings, though complex, are explicable within a 
processing hierarchy ascending from concrete, unimodal 
sensory inputs to more abstract, belief-like levels.28,29 
Within this framework, a computational shift toward 
over-reliance on prior knowledge in perceptual inference 
can explain both the advantage held by predominantly 
hallucination-prone and the disadvantage befalling delu-
sion-prone observers (especially those with low hallucina-
tion-proneness). Critically, these effects might arise from 
overly influential predictions originating from different 
levels of the processing hierarchy.
Predominantly hallucination-prone observers might 
preferentially encode and use prior knowledge gained 
from the template images as perceptual information, con-
ferring an overall advantage discriminating two-tones’ 
embedded figures. While advantageous in this experi-
ment, under natural viewing conditions this might induce 
tendencies to interpret ambiguous sensory information 
using perceptual hypotheses, predisposing to aberrant 
generation of percepts and, in extremis, hallucinations.
Conversely, predominantly delusion-prone observers 
might largely encode template prior knowledge as more 
abstract, belief-like information at upper hierarchical lev-
els. Template knowledge encoded or used at these levels 
might have sufficient information to support inference 
on the coarse gist of two-tone images but be of limited 
use when inferring specific details, as low-level features 
of the template might be summarized at the higher level 
without being specifically encoded. The details of re-
sultant percepts may therefore be subtly inaccurate. This 
would explain preserved performance in the Global con-
dition and poor performance in the Local condition. We 
suggest two ecological manifestations of this computa-
tional shift. Firstly, observers might interpret ambiguous 
sensory information by invoking higher-level beliefs, 
manifesting bizarre or delusional appraisals of events. 
Secondly, observers may be insensitive to fine perceptual 
details, particularly when not consistent with high-level 
beliefs. Percepts would effectively be sculpted to conform 
to expectations, possibly manifesting as false inferences, 
eg, wrongly inferring intentions of others from subtle fa-
cial expressions.
Central to our account is the proposed greater influ-
ence of prior knowledge that might arise to compensate 
for unreliability in signaling of low-level sensory informa-
tion in the visual system. Such unreliability is supported 
by the large body of evidence showing dysfunction of 
early visual processing in psychotic disorders30 and some 
evidence for similar visual impairments associated with 
schizotypal personality.31 These deficits may result in the 
outputs of early processing being noisier and less well 
structured, causing ambiguity in perceptual inference and 











We consider these conclusions preliminary and requir-
ing replication because we used a relatively small sample 
size, found unexpected results and some findings failed 
false discovery rate correction. We found only partial evi-
dence for condition-specific impairment associated with 
delusion-proneness.
Our account critically suggests that it is the type of overly 
influential prior knowledge, such as perceptual vs abstract 
knowledge, that shapes the content of psychotic phenom-
ena. This is agnostic to the exact algorithmic use of that 
prior knowledge.32 Bayesian accounts of predictive cod-
ing would posit that overly influential predictions, akin to 
downweighting predictions errors, cause perceptual infer-
ence to conform to expectations.13,16,27 Within alternative 
accounts like the circular inference model, excitatory top-
down predictions might be mistaken for sensory evidence 
and reverberate, inducing false inferences.14,33
These findings provide a starting point for  understanding 
the considerable heterogeneity of positive psychotic phe-
nomena, observed in clinical samples and the general 
 population but poorly addressed by some current theoretical 
models (though see14). Isolated anomalous perceptions or 
beliefs may represent compensatory changes in using prior 
knowledge at a single locus of a processing  hierarchy, eg, 
aberrant use of perceptual or abstract knowledge. Why then 
would delusions and hallucinations co-occur? Concurrence 
of both phenomena may occur when  adaptation at a single 
level is insufficient to resolve unreliability in sensory inputs 
and the early outputs of sensory processing, leading to a 
propagation of atypicalities in the use of prior knowledge 
throughout the processing hierarchy. Indeed, epidemiolog-
ical evidence suggests that psychotic phenomena become 
clinically relevant as anomalous perceptions are compli-
cated by anomalous beliefs.34 Using a nonclinical sample 
limits our ability to generalize these findings to psychotic 
disorders. However, whether our account of the mechanisms 
of nonclinical psychotic phenomena extends to clinical 
psychotic symptoms is readily testable.
To conclude, our results shed light on the emergence and 
persistence of two seemingly distinct experiences, anoma-
lous perceptions and anomalous beliefs. We put forward 
the notion that these phenomena could arise from a com-
mon computational mechanism, the over-reliance on 
prior knowledge in the generation of percepts, expressed 
at different levels of the information processing hierarchy.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary data are available at Schizophrenia 
Bulletin online.
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